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HORSE RACING REGULATORY REFORM THROUGH
CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT BY INDUSTRY STAKEHOLDERS
WITH STATE REGULATORS
ALEXANDER

M.

WALDROP AND KARL
WITH JOHN W. POLONIS

M.

NOBERT

One of the most frequently asked questions about the horse racing
industry is whether it is capable of making meaningful and positive reforms
without external intervention. Said another way, does the horse racing
industry possess the will and structure to accomplish the safety and
integrity reforms that the public demands? The authors answer these
questions in the affirmative. Through its broad-based membership of
industry stakeholders, the National Thoroughbred Racing Association's
Safety and Integrity Alliance (Alliance) is the organization best positioned
to facilitate the adoption of changes needed for horse racing to grow and
flourish; and is better positioned to do so than Congress, a league office or
even an interstate compact of individual state racing jurisdictions. Relying
on a self-regulatory model, the Alliance facilitates national uniformity
based on industry developed and agreed upon minimum safety and integrity
standards via an established accreditation, compliance, and enforcement
program. As of April 2012, twenty-four racetracks in the United States,
including some of the largest and most visited, have received full
accreditation by the Alliance. Among the currently accredited tracks are
Keeneland, Churchill Downs, Del Mar Thoroughbred Club, Saratoga,
Belmont Park, Gulfstream Park and Pimlico.
Alexander M. Waldrop is the President and Chief Executive Officer of the National
Thoroughbred Racing Association where he leads the Thoroughbred racing industry's national office
responsible for management of issues of national significance to Thoroughbred racing. Mr. Waldrop
spent 13 years with Churchill Downs Incorporated, as President and General Manager of Churchill
Downs Racetrack from 1999 to 2002, as General Counsel from 1992 to 1998, and as senior vice
president, Public Affairs from 2003 to 2004. He is also a former equity partner in the Louisville office
of Wyatt Tarrant & Combs where he was the Chair of the firm's Equine, Gaming & Entertainment
Practice Group. He received his B.A. from Western Kentucky University in 1979, his M.A. from Fuller
Theological Seminary in 1982 and his J.D. (with High Distinction) from the University of Kentucky
College of Law in 1985.
"John W. Polonis is a second year law student at Villanova University School of Law and a
staff writer for the Villanova Sports and Entertainment Law Journal. He graduated cum laude with a
degree in Political Science from Washington State University.

' Tracks, NAT'L THOROUGHBRED RACING Ass'N,
http://www.ntra.com/track/display/list/1(last visited Apr. 1, 2012).
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In this article, the authors argue that the Alliance, and its model of
regulatory reform through constructive engagement by industry
stakeholders with state regulators, offers the best opportunity for bringing
about meaningful and significant safety and integrity reforms to horse
racing.
I. INTRODUCTION

While the last month of the 2011 racing season generated the first
significant increase in pari-mutuel handle in the past four years, horse
racing in the United States has witnessed a decline in wagering, attendance,
and popularity over the past few decades.2 There are many varied reasons
for this decline.3 There is no question that increased competition from
commercial, Native American, and online casino gambling accounts for
much of the decline, but several other identifiable factors have contributed
to this problem as well. One of those contributing factors may be the
absence of a central governing body that could bring authority and
uniformity to a fractious sport. ' Further, fans have been vocal in their calls
for greater human and equine safety, as well as, integrity in the overall
conduct of the sport including improved wagering security and stricter
drug and medication regulation. These concerns evidence the need for
greater structure, organization, and uniformity in the horse racing. 6
As the horse racing industry weighs its options for the future, its
highest priority should be the adoption of industry-wide reforms that will
help the sport to grow and flourish. 7 Such reforms must not only encourage
See Matt Hegarty, Handle on U.S. Races Soars 18% in December; 2011 Handle Down
5.65%, DAILY RACING FORUM, (Jan. 5, 2012), http://www.drf.com/news/handle-us-races-soars-18december-201 I -handle-down-565 (recognizing declining trend in wagering handle for horseracing
industry and reporting significant increase in national handle for December 2011. Even by factoring in
the significant increases in handle from December 2011, "[the national] handle still remains 28.9 percent
lower than the 2003 figure, unadjusted for inflation.").
3 Bennett Liebman, Reasons for the Decline of Horse Racing, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2010)
http://therail.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/06/reasons-for-the-decline-of-horse-racing/ (arguing that other
forms of gambling, traditional individual sports, suburbanization of America, corruption, drugs, public
perception, government involvement, media, and various other factors are to blame for decline of
horseracing).
4 Michael Mancini, New Study Shows Horse Racing in Decline, INTERN ETPOKER.COM (Aug.
15, 2011) http://wwwx .internetpoker.com/Poker-News/Poker-Industry/New-Study-Shows-Horse-Racingin-Decline-4323.html (noting that "[w]hile horse racing was in decline over the last decade, commercial
casinos were thriving, seeing a 34% growth from 2001 to 2010.").
s Luke Breslin, Reclaiming the Glory in the "Sport of Kings" Uniformity is the Answer, 20
SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 297, 314-15 (2010) (recognizing problems in horseracing stemming
from lack of centralized governing body and lack of uniformity due to state specific regulations).
6 See id. at 315 (arguing that patchwork of rules amongst states has led to many regulatory
problems, including decline in health and safety of horses).
Id. at 323-24 (advocating for industry-wide change in regulation to "advance the overall
state of American horse racing.").
2
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fans to return to the tracks, but entice new owners to join the game, increase
the overall transparency and integrity of the sport, and make it easier for
industry leaders to implement change on a uniform basis nationwide. An
effective regulatory response will recognize that human and equine safety
and the integrity of the sport are essential to horse racing's long-term
survival. Through the implementation of such reforms, horse racing has an
opportunity to regain its central place in American culture. '
Responding to the public's call for change, the National
Thoroughbred Racing Association (NTRA) formed the Alliance in 2009.9
The purpose of the Alliance is to act as a catalyst for change within the
horse racing industry.'o The Alliance, which is composed of a wide variety
of industry stakeholders, uses a self-regulatory model to implement uniform
reforms on a nationwide basis." Unlike other more traditional selfregulatory approaches which eschew government involvement or
intervention, the Alliance is a broad-based industry mechanism that has as
its ultimate objective the implementation of optimal and uniform state
regulation. 12
Representing a collaborative and comprehensive response to the
regulatory challenges facing horse racing, the Alliance provides a very
practical approach for achieving a level of national uniformity among the
many state governments that regulate racing at the local level. It does this
by advocating national uniformity based on industry-specific and agreed
upon minimum standards and best practices.1 3 The Alliance implements and
enforces these standards through a comprehensive and member-adopted
accreditation, compliance, and enforcement program.14 For these reasons,
the Alliance may be the best option for securing long term, uniform change
in the way that horse racing is regulated in the United States."

See id. at 298 (detailing history of horse racing as "a national pastime in the United States,
despite the considerable and well-known stigmas attached to the sport."); Jennifer M. Jabroski, Note,
Reining in the Horse Racing Industry: A Proposalfor FederalRegulation of Steroid Use in Racehorses,
I KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC. & NAT. RESOURCES L. 67, 68 (2009) (addressing need for uniformity and
reform in horseracing industry).
9 NAT'L THOROUGHBRED RACING Ass'N SAFETY & INTEGRITY ALLIANCE, CODE OF
STANDARDS
2 (2011), available at http://www.ntra.com/safetyalliance/Final_2011_Code.pdf
[hereinafter CODE OF STANDARDS (2011)].
o See id.
See id.
12See id.

13See id. (describing how Alliance sets forth for its Members minimum set of standards to
encourage national uniformity and compliance).
14See generally CODE OF STANDARDS (2011), supra note 9.
15See id at 2 (describing amendment process as new research and recommendations become
available to provide industry with long term regulatory solution).
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II. THE PUBLIC'S DEMANDS OF RACING

Several high profile and televised horse injuries and fatalities,
including Barbaro in the 2006 Preakness Stakes and Eight Belles in the
2008 Kentucky Derby, coupled with the 2008 admission that a Triple
Crown contender was openly administered legal anabolic steroids has
caused the public's demands for reform to grow exponentially.16 These
demands for change focused on two primary areas - human and equine
safety and the integrity of the sport. One of the most frequently asked
questions stemming from these public demands, and one that has yet to be
fully answered, is whether the industry is capable of making the necessary
reforms without external intervention by Congress or some other private or
administrative body.
III. How IS HORSE RACING CURRENTLY REGULATED IN THE UNITED
STATES

The horse racing industry in the United States is regulated via a
decentralized model that places regulatory authority in the hands of state
authorities.' 7 These authorities are individually responsible for regulating
all aspects of the sport within their respective jurisdictions. Currently, there
are thirty-eight separate and distinct states that allow the conduct of parimutuel horse racing. 8 Each state's regulatory authority possesses the power
to license all participants; adopt and implement drug and medication
testing; enforce its respective rules; and allocate the number of race dates.1 9
The individual jurisdictions are further responsible for ensuring the safety
of all participants and the overall integrity of the sport not only for pari-

16 Mike Klingaman, Five Years Late: Barbaro'sDeath Remembered,
THE BALTIMORE SUN
(Jan. 28, 2012), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2012-01-28/sports/bs-sp-barbaro-0129-201201278 Igretchen-jackson-pennsylvania-s-new-bolton-center-barbaro (discussing how Barbaro captured
public's attention and catapulted safety and health of thoroughbreds in racing to national level); see also
Eight Belles' Death Sparks Controversy, CBSNEWS (Feb. 11, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-

201 _162-4069876.html (describing how death of Eight Belles at 2008 Kentucky Derby sparked
controversy on national level about safety and integrity of horseracing); Daily News Staff, Big Brown's
Legal Doping a Concern, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (May 15, 2008), http://articles.nydailynews.com/2008-0515/sports/17897265_1 big-brown-doping-racing-medication (reporting on Big Brown's trainer
revealing use of steroids in preparation for Triple Crown races and subsequent public reactions).
17
Five Ways to Improve the Industry, BLOODHORSE.COM (Mar. 22, 2011),
http://cs.bloodhorse.com/blogs/industry-voices/archive/2011/03/22/five-ways-to-improve-theindustry.aspx.
18 Blood-Horse Staff, Kentucky Racing Compact Bill Signed Into Law, BLOODHORSE.COM
(May 3, 2011), http://www.bloodhorse.com/horse-racing/articles/62809/kentucky-racing-compact-billsigned-into-law.
9 See 30A C.J.S. Entertainmentand Amusement §27 (2011).
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mutuel wagers, but also for owners, trainers, jockeys, the horses, and any
others who participate in the sport of horse racing.2 0
The existence of such a decentralized model combined with (i) a
lack of regulatory uniformity from state to state, (ii) overly burdensome
financial rules that include both antiquated tax laws and statutorily
mandated take-out rates, and (iii) the sport's overall inability to quickly and
uniformly adapt to market forces, have all combined to limit the sport's
ability to grow in the face of competition for the wagering dollar.
A. The Advent of the DecentralizedRegulatory Model

With the expansion of regulatory government under President
Franklin D. Roosevelt and increased power sharing with the state
legislatures in the 1930s, the states assumed more control over all aspects of
daily life, including the governance of the sport of horse racing.2 1 States,
empowered to exercise delegated powers for a public purpose, adopted
rules intended to protect and ensure the safety of trainers, jockeys, owners,
spectators, and the horses themselves.22 This sweeping power allowed the
various state racing commissions to adopt and implement local rules
intended to ensure the integrity of the sport and to guarantee the fairness of
the races for the purpose of protecting those wagering on the sport.23 Such
authority to regulate the sport has remained with the states and has resulted
in the decentralized regulatory model currently in place.2 4
Traditionally, the state racing commissions have focused on four
broad areas of regulatory oversight. These include licensing, rulemaking,
enforcement, and penalties.2 5 Each is briefly described below.
1. Licensing

The states control over licensing was confirmed in 1951. This
marked a decisive change in the sport because state governments could no
26
longer delegate licensing power to private organizations. Instead, the
power to license was vested in state racing commissions, which require
racing participants to obtain an occupational license and pay a licensing
20 See id
21 Joan S.

Howland, Let's Not "Spit the Bit" in Defense of "The Law of the Horse ": The
Historicaland Legal Development ofAmerican ThoroughbredRacing, 14 MARQ. SPORTS L. REv. 473,
498 (2004).
22 See 30A C.J.S. Entertainment and
Amusement § 27 (2011).
23 See id
24 See id
25 See id
26 Fink v. Cole, 97 N.E.2d 873, 876 (N.Y. 1951);
see also Howland, supra note 21, at 50304.
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fee. Among those required to purchase licenses were horse owners,
trainers, jockeys, drivers, backstretch personnel, and concessionaires.2 8
Even after the power to license shifted to the states, other responsibilities
remained under the authority of private entities such as The Jockey Club,
which retained responsibility for the breed registry.2 9
2. Rulemaking
With the regulatory power shift, the state racing commissions also
gained rulemaking authority to implement rules and regulations. 3 0 To this
day, state racing commissions maintain wide regulatory discretion. They
have implemented rules and regulations impacting all aspects of the sport
including licensing, race calendars, medication and testing, trainer
responsibility, and even the conduct and pricing of pari-mutuel wagering
through the regulation of pari-mutuel take-out percentages. 3 1 To satisfy due
process requirements, an implemented horse racing statute or regulation
must convey what conduct is prohibited and what penalties may be
imposed.32
Arguably the most important and highly contested of these rules
delegated to the state racing commissions are the trainer-responsibility
rules. Focusing on the prevention of drug use in horse racing, the rules
serve the same purpose as the rules prior to the emergence of state racing
commissions - to prevent the use of illegal drugs, maintain the integrity of
the sport, and uphold public confidence in the horse racing industry. 33
Under the trainer-responsibility rules, when a horse tests positive for a
prohibited drug or medication, the trainer is held accountable regardless of
who actually administered the prohibited substance.34 This is still generally
true even if someone other than the trainer administers a prohibited drug or
gives contaminated feed to the trainer's horse.

27 Jewel

N. Klein & Ray H. Garrison, Practiceand ProcedureBefore Racing Commissions,
78 Ky. L.J. 477, 481 (1990).
28 id,
29 Howland, supranote 21, at 498-99.
30See 30A C.J.S. Entertainmentand Amusement § 27 (2011).
31 See Bradley S. Friedman, Oats, Water, Hay and Everything Else: The
Regulation of
Anabolic Steroids in ThoroughbredHorse Racing, 16 ANIMAL L. 123, 133 (2009).
32 See id. at 132.
3 Id. at 133.
34 Bennett Liebman, The Trainer Responsibility Rule In Horse Racing, 7 VA. SPORTS & ENT.
L.J. 1, 2 (2007).
35

id.
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3. Enforcement

States typically delegate their enforcement capabilities to an
executive director and staff of the state racing commission.3 6 For example,
Kentucky has an executive director appointed by the Governor. This
individual's primary duty is to carry out the policy and program directives
of the state's racing commission. 38 The executive director handles the daily
ministerial operations and enforces the rules of the commission.3 9
When rule violations occur or are suspected to have occurred, the
initial step is to hold a stewards' hearing.40 If the steward's decision is not
binding under state law, then the affected party can appeal to the state
racing commission.4 1 Depending on the issue in question, a party that
remains dissatisfied may also appeal to the state or federal appellate court.4 2
When a steward or judge finds that the horse racing regulations have been
violated, civil penalties may be imposed. 4 3
4. Civil Penalties

State racing commissions have a variety of civil penalties at their
disposal when violations occur. Penalties may include changing the
finishing order of the race, prohibiting participation in the purse,
disqualifying a winning horse, or fining trainers, owners, or other persons
for the violation." Prior to a race, owners are given notice of these penalties
through a state statute, rule, or policy manual. 45 For example, if a winning
horse tests positive for an illegal drug after it finishes a successful race, then
the state racing commission may redistribute the winning purse.46
Trainers may also be suspended for violating a state's rules.
Although other racing commissions generally honor these suspensions,
there are still instances today where such suspensions are not recognized in
neighboring jurisdictions.4 7 In cases where one commission fails to honor
another state's suspension of a trainer, the deterrent effect of civil penalties
See 30A C.J.S. EntertainmentandAmusement §27 (2011).
3 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 230.230(1) (West 2011).
38 Id
3 See 30A C.J.S. Entertainmentand Amusement § 27 (2011).
40 Kimberli Gasparon, The Dark Horse of Drug Abuse: Legal Issues of Administering
PerformanceEnhancing Drugs to Racehorses, 16 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 199, 204 (2009).
41 Id
42 Id.
4 See 30A C.J.S. Entertainmentand Amusement §27 (2011).
4 Id.
45 See id
46 Id.
47 See Gasparon,supra note 40, at 205.
36
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is undermined. 48 Along with penalizing the trainers, some states penalize
veterinarians who prescribe the drugs. 4 9 Some states, such as Kentucky, will
enforce both criminal sanctions and civil penalties against violators. 0
B. Limitations of the Current Model
Currently, the states individually regulate all aspects of horse racing
under a decentralized model. Therefore, the individual states do not act
simultaneously and the overall sport lacks the regulatory uniformity that
one sees in other major American sports, such as professional baseball or
basketball. There is no established structure by which to implement and
enforce uniform national rules. Additionally, industry stakeholders have
few opportunities to access or participate in the rulemaking process in every
racing jurisdiction. Considering that racing may take place in as many as
thirty-eight jurisdictions, the process of trying to convince individual racing
commissions to cooperate in creating a comprehensive solution is
burdensome, time-consuming, and expensive for stakeholders.
While the Association of Racing Commissioners International
(ARCI) publishes model rules, there is no mechanism by which to enact
and enforce these model rules in individual jurisdictions." Even those
jurisdictions that use the ARCI model rules as a guide for adopting new
regulatory rules often modify them slightly, or significantly, to suit their
-52
individual circumstances.
The sport is also made up of numerous stakeholders with varying
interests and those interests do not always coincide. 3 Stakeholders involved
in the sport include the regulators themselves, track operators, jockeys,
owners, breeders, trainers, racing associations, the online betting services,
and aftercare organizations. 54 "It's rare when all these parties are on the
same page. This really paralyzes the industry and makes it very difficult to

48 Id.

49Id.
'o See id

Model

Rules,

RACING

COMMISSIONERS

INT'L,

http://www.arci.com/RacingCommissionersInternational/ModelRules.html
(last visited Mar. 4,
2012).
52 Blood-Horse Staff, Approval of Bute Rule Slowed in Louisiana, BLOODHORSE.COM
(Jan.
28, 2012), http://www.bloodhorse.com/horse-racing/articles/67179/approval-of-bute-rule-slowed-inlouisiana.
5 Paul Doocey, Post Time for Change, CASINO JOURNAL (Feb. 1, 2010).
s4 The Jockey Club Fact Book - National Economic Impact Study: Size of The Horse Industry
(1995), availableat http://www.equatecorp.com/numbers%20page.html (last visited March 12, 2012).
The

Equine

Industry,

THE

JOCKEY

CLUB

http://www.equatecorp.com/numbers%/20page.html (last visited, Apr. 2, 2012).

FACT

BOOK,
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respond to changing market conditions."" Such differences are a leading
contributor to the difficulties in achieving national cooperation and
regulatory uniformity.
The lack of uniformity combined with the difficulties associated
with developing and implementing a cooperative approach have contributed
to a regulatory environment that favors the status quo. Since the states
regulate the sport within their own respective borders, a semi-competitive
environment exists whereby states compete for racing business from
owners and trainers because they are capable of searching for the most
favorable and least burdensome racing venues. 56 This system has created a
forum shopping practice of sorts intended to entice racing business, 57 and
has created little or no incentive for the states to dramatically change their
rules.
C. Economic Restraints Limiting Growth

The presence of outdated and antiquated rules in the sport also
contributes to the economic restraints on growth and reform. For example,
the existence of outdated tax laws and legally mandated take-out rates have
hampered the horse racing industry's ability to compete with other forms of
legalized gambling, such as those offered by casinos and sports books.
Such restrictive and archaic economic regulations have had a direct and
adverse impact on the sport and its ability to grow.
Many of the taxes applicable to horse racing today were passed at a
time when the sport was the only legalized form of gambling in the United
States.
Starting in the 1920's, race tracks were granted lucrative
monopolies to conduct pari-mutuel wagering in a state in return for the
payment of high excise taxes - taxes assessed on gross handle and not net
revenue.5 9 With the emergence of lotteries and casinos, many of the state
5 Doocey, supra note 53 (quoting Eugene Christiansen, principal of research firm
Christiansen Capital Advisors).
56 See Fred A. Pope, Commentary: Time to Change the Structure, THOROUGHBRED TIMES
(Sept.
I1,
2011),
available
at
http://www.thoroughbredtimes.com/nationalnews/2011/09/ll /commentary-time-to-change-the-structure.aspx (noting that by allowing questionable
practices, more horses may attend races and more jobs may be created for the state).
" See id.

PROGRAMS

PERRY NUTT, ET. AL., KENTUCKY THOROUGHBRED BREEDING INDUSTRY AND STATE
THAT
ASSIST
'THE
EQUINE
INDUSTRY
21
(2011),
available
at

http://media.kentucky.com/smedia/2011/11/10/14/52/51jr2.So.79.pdf.
5 Richard A. McGowan, A Short History of Gambling in the United States,
GALE: OPPOSING
VIEWPOINTS,

http://ic.galegroup.com/ic/ovic/ViewpointsDetailsPage/ViewpointsDetailsWindow?displayGroupName
=Viewpoints&disableHighlighting-false&prodld=0oVIC&action=2&catld=&documenttd=GALE% 7CE
130100 79223&userGroupName=sacr7303 1&jsid=62916e0a417a2c9be8c6da4f4edc7ffc
(last visited
Apr. 1, 2012).
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tax laws applied to wagering on racing now serve as economic restraints.o
However, states have been slow to relinquish excise taxes that they
traditionally received from horse racing even though racing's monopoly
status is long gone.61 These taxes limit racing's ability to price its product
competitively and restrict access to the capital needed to upgrade racing
facilities. Moreover, this antiquated taxation model also explains one of the
primary obstacles to a centralized regulatory model. Since the tax revenues
generated by horse racing are currently going into their respective state
coffers, states simply are not willing to give up any autonomy and the
revenues that flow from such autonomy. In many states, there is heavy
reliance on the excise taxes levied on horse racing to fund other state
*62
programs and services.
IV. MODELS FOR REFORM

To grow and flourish into the future, the sport needs to adopt and
implement a regulatory model that achieves some measure of national
uniformity. Possible alternatives to replace the current decentralized model
that have been suggested include (i) Congressional intervention and
regulation, (ii) privatization, and (ii) an interstate compact. A collaborative
and industry-supported organization that is responsible for implementing
and enforcing a code of uniform standards like the Alliance, offers the best
opportunity for success moving forward.
In order to better understand why the Alliance is the best
alternative, the concepts of Congressional intervention, privatization, and
an Interstate Compact are analyzed below.
A. CongressionalIntervention and Regulation

Congressional intervention and regulation is an approach frequently
advocated both by those within and those outside of the horse racing
industry. Some view it as the only way to impose regulatory uniformity on
the industry as a whole. However, such a solution carries significant
political risks, including the possibility of subjecting the sport to crushing
new taxation and regulation. Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that
the same forces keeping racing under the regulatory control of states will
also expend enormous energy to thwart any effort at federalizing horse
See Doocey, supra note 53.
See id. (noting that States like the taxes generated by the horse racing industry).
62 For example, in Kentucky, the excise taxes levied on horse
racing fund the state
Thoroughbred Development Fund, Standardbred Development Fund, Quarter Horse, Appaloosa, and
Arabian Development Fund, and the Equine Industry Program at the University of Louisville. See KY.
REv. STAT. ANN. §l38.510(l)(c) (West 2010).
60
61
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racing. The lost revenue to state governments alone is reason enough to
expect resistance to federalization. Add to that idea the notion that our
federal system is increasingly looking to states and localities to regulate
personal economic behavior and you have an environment that is anything
but receptive to federal intervention.
Furthermore, there appears to be no interest in creating a new
federal bureaucracy for racing. The costs involved and the fact that those
who would be regulating the sport are unfamiliar with the workings of
horse racing provide ample reason to proceed very cautiously where federal
intervention is involved. More likely than not, horse racing would be faced
with overlapping federal and state regulatory schemes resulting in new
costly, burdensome, and potentially inconsistent regulation.
One final concern is that the passage of federal legislation and the
creation of a federal bureaucracy will make racing vulnerable to forces
hostile to its existence. Lacking knowledge and familiarity, federal
lawmakers and regulators may be urged to impose rules and penalties that
could cripple the sport. Without an intimate knowledge of the business and
its many positive contributions to host state economies, damage could be
done to the livelihoods of many people by federal authorities who are far
too removed from the consequences of their actions. For these reasons,
federal intervention has never been the preferred route for horse racing
oversight or regulation.
B. Privatization

The privatization of the sport through the formation of a conference
or sports league is another solution often pushed by industry reformers.6 3 In
fact, leagues and conferences have proven to be very helpful to the
commercialization of a wide variety of sports in the United States. 64 The
National Football League is an excellent example for understanding the
potential commercial upside to a cooperative arrangement like a sports
league. The challenge for horse racing is that such affiliations require
individual states and their respective regulatory authorities, horsemen's
organizations, racing associations, jockeys, and other participants to cede
their regulatory and commercial authority to a private centralized body.
Considering the financial interests of the individual state in horse racing
and the many independent financial interests of the participants, such
privatization models have proven time and again to be unworkable.
61 See

Pope, supra note 56 (discussing the advantages of a league-based model
with a talent-

centered focus).
64 See id
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Moreover, the very nature of the sport itself and its economic
reliance upon pari-mutuel wagering poses a serious challenge to
privatization. Historically, the public has always been distrustful of
privately regulated gambling operations.6 5 In addition, there are serious
antitrust concerns that arise whenever competitors combine to form
organizations with significant economic power. 66- Even if a private solution
could be devised that survived antitrust scrutiny, there remains a hesitation
among industry stakeholders to move in the direction of cooperation and a
pooling of rights and authority.67 In short, the necessary industry
cooperation on commercial and regulatory matters is elusive at best and
probably non-existent.
C. Interstate Compact

An interstate compact covering aspects of racing and wagering also
presents a common multi-jurisdictional approach for promoting regulatory
uniformity. With the goal of including members from each state racing
jurisdiction, an interstate compact could provide an expedited process for
publishing a much-needed uniform rulebook and forum for responding to
national issues impacting the sport. Ideally, an interstate compact could
facilitate the adoption of rules in member states without usurping individual
68
state sovereignty. In fact, the sport's move to regulatory uniformity is
actually closer than it appears when viewing where races are currently held.
Six states comprise fifty percent of all purses nationally and sixteen states

See Roger Dunstan, Gambling in California: History of Gambling in the United States,
CAL. RES. BUREAU (Jan. 1997), http://www.library.ca.gov/crb/97/03/Chapt2.html.
66 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2004); Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States,
221 U.S. I
(1911). The Sherman Antitrust Act ("Sherman Act") was passed in 1890 to combat anticompetitive
practices, reduce market domination by individual corporations, and preserve unfettered competition in
trade and commerce. As applied to horse racing in the past, it is intended to prevent collusion and anticompetitive conduct. Violations under the Sherman Act take one of two forms either as a per se
violation or as a violation of the rule of reason. Under the Act, certain business practices are deemed to
be per se violations. A per se violation requires no further inquiry into the practice's actual effect on the
market. For those practices however that are not as clear, the courts apply a totality of the circumstances
test known as the Rule of Reason that asks whether an alleged practice promotes or suppresses market
competition. The fact that tracks and all horsemen are independent competitors and that each operates
pari-mutuel wagering in a separate market pursuant to a state-granted monopoly makes it unlikely that
any organization of racetracks or horsemen that sets simulcasting rates, controls race dates, or performs
any other traditional regulatory function will survive anti-trust scrutiny.
6' Empire State Harness Horsemen's Alliance, New York Horsemen Oppose Interstate
Racing and Wagering Compact, HARNESS RACING
NEWSROOM
(June
24,
2010),
http://xwebapp.ustrotting.com/absolutenm/templates/article.aspxarticleid=37592&zoneid=1.
68 See Tom LaMarra, State Legislators Told Compact Viable Option, BLOODHORSE.COM
(July 28, 2010), http://www.bloodhorse.com/horse-racing/articles/58 101/state-legislators-told-compactviable-option.
65
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comprise ninety percent of all purses nationally.69 Thus, it is likely possible
to get a high degree of uniformity with relatively few states in a compact.
The ARCI has developed compact is known as the Racing
Regulatory Compact (the "RRC") to provide a national approach to racing
regulation. 70 The RRC includes an internal rule making process that relies
on industry advisory committees. Similar to existing federal and state
regulatory agencies, the RRC utilizes standard notice and comment
procedures for maximum input and participation from the industry and the
public.n
Despite the RRC's potential benefits, there are several challenges
associated with the development and ongoing continuance of it. Among the
challenges to its success is the reluctance of some industry stakeholders to
centralize regulatory power and authority. 72 Additionally, the RRC includes
voluntary opt out provisions. These provisions are absolutely necessary to
gain support at the state level, but they ultimately limit the overall
effectiveness of the RRC because they undermine the goal of uniformity,
which is the very reason for the RRC.7 ' Due to these challenges, states have
been slow to adopt the RRC. To date, only a few states including Kentucky,
Arizona and Colorado, have adopted the RRC, and the proposal has faced
major opposition in other states where its passage has been attempted but
shelved for the time being. Given these significant industry and political
hurdles, the RRC does not appear to be a viable solution at present.75
V. THE NTRA ALLIANCE IS THE MOST ACHIEVABLE SOLUTION

If the current decentralized model is not working and none of the
models discussed above are viable options presently, what is the solution to
the public's demand for change? A self-regulatory organization, such as the
model presented by the Alliance, is currently the most achievable solution
6 PEGGY HENDERSHOT, PROPOSED INTERSTATE RACING AND WAGERING COMPACT 3(Dec.

8, 2009), available at http://www.ua-rtip.org/symposium/2009/09_powerpoint/hendershot_peggy.pdf
(presentation at Race Track Industry Symposium).
'o See Tom LaMarra, Officials: Compact Comes At A Critical Point, BLOODHORSE.COM
(Apr. 13, 2010), http://www.bloodhorse.com/horse-racing/articles/56414/officials-compact-comes-atcritical-point.
' RACING COMM'RS INT'L, MODEL LEGISLATION FOR A NATIONAL RACING REGULATORY

ENTITY: NEW INTERSTATE COMPACT TO FACILITATE STATE REGULATION OF RACING AND WAGERING
13
(Feb.
10,
2010),
available
at
http://www.racingcompact.com/New RacingRegulatoryCompact/RRC_files/2011 02_10 Compact
Model Bill_.pdf.
72 See LaMarra,supra note 70.
7 See Janet Patton, Racing, Wagering Compact Calledfor, KENTUCKY.COM (Mar. 31,
2010),
http://www.kentucky.com/2010/03/3 1/1203843/racing-wagering-compact-called.html.
7 See COLO. REV. STAT. §12-60-202(5) (2010), see also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §230.3761
(West 2011). But see generally Empire State Harness Horsemen's Alliance, supra note 67.
* Empire State Harness Horsemen's Alliance, supra note 67.
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to the sport's need for uniform regulatory change. First, it is important to
understand what is meant by the phrase "self regulatory organization"
(SRO), and determine the ways in which the Alliance incorporates the
various benefits of a SRO in furtherance of the goal of uniform national
regulation.
A. SelfRegulatory Organizations
1. Function
A SRO is used by various industries such as healthcare, education,
and insurance because such an organization increases legitimacy,
establishes standards for the industry, provides a mechanism to enforce
adherence to industry norms, and fills a perceived gap in federal and state
regulatory oversight thereby staving off further government intervention.76
Examples of such organizations, which are currently functioning
effectively, include the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of
Healthcare Organization (healthcare), the Clearing House Payments
Company (banking) and the Entertainment Software Rating Board (video
games) .

2. Strengths
SROs have many strengths. They can be organized quickly around
a basic code of conduct and they can adapt quickly to changing
circumstances. They also utilize the industry's inherent knowledge and
historical experience to create realistic and effective standards. Most
importantly for horse racing, SROs can provide a degree of national
uniformity to industries that are not federally regulated.
Further, SROs are a useful tool for industries that need national and
uniform regulation due to SROs inherent flexibility. When correctly
implemented, SROs can supplement and enhance state regulation. They are
designed to evolve over time, allowing an industry to develop processes for
addressing future challenges and for the development of industry wide best
practices.

7 Memorandum
from Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP on Self-Regulatory
Organizations to Alex Waldrop, Nat'l Thoroughbred Racing Ass'n President and CEO 2 (on file with
author).
n Id. at 2.
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3. Potential Weaknesses

Despite the many strengths of SROs, they do have potential areas
of weakness. SROs require industry-wide acceptance and the public, at
times, may be skeptical of industry vigilance and impartiality. Another
perceived weakness is that an SRO's sanctioning and enforcement powers
are limited; for example, they typically cannot impose monetary fines.
Thus, considering that enforcement is essential to establishing an SRO's
legitimacy in the eyes of regulators and the public generally, an SRO must
have a thorough and effective list of consequences for non-compliance. In
other words, unless the SRO can certify compliance and punish noncompliant participants, there will be skeptics about its effectiveness.
B. Introduction to the NTRA Safety and Integrity Alliance

Given the many benefits of the SRO model, the NTRA created the
Alliance in response to the public's demand for changes to the sport and as
a vehicle by which to improve the safety and integrity of the industry. 78 At
the time of launch, the Alliance was endorsed by fifty-five industry
stakeholders, including racetracks, owners, breeders, horsemen, jockeys,
veterinarians, and sales companies who agreed to uphold and support the
goals and objectives of the organization. 9 In an industry with
"decentralized power" and "fractious" participants, the Alliance provides a
centralized framework for the adoption of minimum standards which are
enforced through an established track accreditation process.so
Since its formation, the Alliance has fully accredited some twentyfour racetracks, certifying their compliance with the Alliance's
comprehensive Code of Standards (the "Code")." Working cooperatively
with the state governments of each state where a track has been accredited,
the Alliance has proven to be an effective tool for improving the national
regulatory environment for horse racing. Most importantly, as will be
demonstrated below, the Alliance and its accreditation process have proven
" See Tom LaMarra, NTRA Seeks Directorfor New Alliance, BLOODHORSE.COM (Oct. 23,
2008),
http://www.bloodhorse.com/horse-racing/articles/47726/ntra-seeks-director-for-new-alliance
(discussing announcement of safety and integrity initiative and appointment process for Alliance
Director).
79 See id
80See CODE OF STANDARDS (2011), supra note 9, at 2.
" As of the writing of this article, the following race tracks have received Alliance
accreditation: Aqueduct Racetrack, Arlington Park, Belmont Park, Calder Race Course, Canterbury
Park, Churchill Downs, Del Mar Thoroughbred Club, Fair Grounds Race Course, Finger Lakes Casino
and Racetrack, Golden Gate Fields, Hollywood Park, Keeneland Race Course, Kentucky Downs,
Monmouth Park, Pimlico Race Course, Santa Anita, Saratoga Race Course, Suffolk Downs, Sunland
Park, Turfway Park, and Woodbine. See Tracks, supra note 1.
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to be a catalyst for a broader commitment to the health and safety of the
industry's human and equine athletes, and to the integrity of the sport which are top priorities for the industry.
1. Prompt Implementation
After its formation, the Alliance quickly put into practice a wide
range of safety and integrity recommendations. 82 Its ability to move quickly
and decisively was key to successful implementation. The Alliance also
provided the industry with a mechanism to work toward solutions in other
areas of the sport. Importantly, all major tracks and horsemen's groups,
which quickly agreed to adhere to industry norms through an established
and implemented track accreditation process, quickly endorsed the
Alliance.
2. CollaborativeSolution
The Alliance provides a collaborative solution to the various safety
and integrity issues that currently exist in the sport. Composed of a wide
range of industry stakeholders, the Alliance represents the collective
consideration and work product of key stakeholder organizations and
individuals within the horse racing industry.8 4 By assembling a diverse
array of industry stakeholders, the Alliance uses industry knowledge and
experience to create realistic and effective standards that can be universally
applied and implemented across all racing jurisdictions via the
organization's established track accreditation program. To that end,
Alliance members must individually and collectively commit to ensuring
"that the sport of horse racing is pursued in a manner consistent with high
ethical standards and compliance with applicable laws and regulations."

82 See generally NAT'L THOROUGHBRED RACING ASS'N SAFETY & INTEGRITY ALLIANCE,

CODE OF STANDARDS (2009), available at http://www.ntra.com/images/CODEOFSTANDARDS.pdf
[hereinafter CODE OF STANDARDS (2009)]
83 Id.
84 See TOMMY G. THOMPSON, NATIONAL THOROUGHBRED RACING ASSOCIATION
SAFETY

AND

INTEGRITY

ALLIANCE: REPORT

OF THE INDEPENDENT MONITOR

3 (2011),

available at

http://www.ntra.com/images/NTRA_2011 Report of theIndependent Monitor.pdf
(recognizing
Alliance's central role for every horsemen's group in United States to pledge support for upholding
health and safety of racing's athletes, both human and equine).
85See generallyCODE OF STANDARDS (2011), supra note 9, at 2.
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3. Comprehensive Standards

The Alliance sets forth a comprehensive list of minimum standards
in its Code, which are implemented by Alliance members in their respective
roles in the horse racing industry.8 6 The Code is intended to be an ever
changing and evolving document that is consistently updated over time with
new research and as industry stakeholders put forth recommendations.
When originally adopted, the Code included five broad categories - 1)
injury reporting and prevention; 2) a safer racing environment; 3)
medication and testing; 4) jockey welfare and safety; and 5) aftercare for
retired horses. Within those broad categories, specific standards were
outlined.
Consistent with its original intent to be an ever-evolving document
that is updated as industry expectations change and as new research
becomes available, the current Code has been expanded to reflect changing
safety and integrity needs.8 9 The current Code addresses 1) injury reporting
and prevention; 2) a safer racing environment; 3) medication and testing; 4)
jockey safety and health; 5) aftercare for retired horses; and 6) wagering
security. 90 Below, is a brief overview of each of the principal components
of the Code, as it currently exists.
(a) Injury and FatalityReporting and Prevention
The Code requires the timely and accurate reporting of injuries and

fatalities for the purposes of building and maintaining a national database
that can be studied and analyzed to identify the causes of horse injuries and
fatalities, and for determining what precautions are necessary to lessen the
incidence and severity of horse injuries. 9' Once accredited, Alliance
members are required to immediately begin reporting injuries sustained and
fatalities suffered at the member's track, including race periods and nonrace periods. 92 It is intended that The Jockey Club's existing Equine Injury
86 Id.
87

id.

88 CODE

OF STANDARDS (2009), supra note 82.
89CODE OF STANDARDS (2011), supra note 9, at 2. For Racetrack Alliance Members that
received accreditation under the original 2009 Code, these members will be permitted to continue
complying with the original 2009 Code until the expiration or revocation of their applicable twenty-four
(24) month accreditation period. Thereafter, upon re-accreditation, the members will be required to
comply with the revised version of the Code in effect at the time.
90Id.
91See CODE OF STANDARDS (2011) at § 1.
92 See CODE OF STANDARDS (2011) at § 1(A). "Race Period" is defined as "the time period
from the entry of a horse in a race through release of a horse from post-race testing." Id. at 5. The term
"Non-Race Period" is defined as "any day or period of time not part of a Race Period." Id at 4.
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Database will be used for this purpose.93 With continued and
comprehensive maintenance of the database, nationwide statistics can be
extracted and made available to the public from time to time for purposes of
measuring progress in achieving greater safety. As a result, the public's
confidence in the injury reporting process and the integrity of the sport will
increase.
Further, the Code mandates, as a condition of accreditation,
thorough and comprehensive pre- and post-race examinations by qualified
veterinarians to ensure that all horses entered to race and returning from
races are medically fit to continue racing. 94 Post-race inspections of all
horses returning from every race are utilized to determine if the returning
horses are injured, lame, or unsound. 95 In addition to pre- and post-race
examinations, the Code requires that post-mortem veterinary examinations
be performed on all horses that die or are euthanized at an accredited
racetrack.96
The required pre-race examinations that accredited tracks or their
respective state regulatory authorities must conduct are substantially
similar, in form and substance, to RCI Model Rule ARCI-0 11-030(A). 97 If
an accredited track's state regulatory authority is not conducting compliant
pre-race exams, the track must petition its state regulators to adopt the
mandatory pre-race inspection protocol referenced above to keep its
accredited status. 98 This advocacy requirement is imposed on Alliance
accredited tracks for this and several other requirements found in the Code
because it is an essential element of the Alliance's objective to create
greater uniformity among state regulatory authorities. 99 Further, advocacy
provisions encourage the state authorities to be actively engaged in the
accreditation process so that the state can and will utilize its legal
enforcement rights to encourage compliance. The state's unique ability to
punish non-compliance also adds credibility to the Alliance process.
Horses that fail such pre- and post-race examinations are to be
added to a maintained veterinarians' list, complying with RCI Model Rule
ARCI-01 1-030(B), that includes the names of all horses that are determined
to be unfit to compete in a race due to illness, physical distress,

93
94 See CODE OF STANDARDS (2011) at

1d.

§ 1(B)-(C).

§ 1(A).

CODE OF STANDARDS (2011), supra note 9, at § I (B)-(C).
Such Post-Mortem Veterinary Examinations are to be conducted in compliance
with the AAEP Guidelines for Necropsy of Racehorses.
9 Id. § 1(B)-(C); see also MODEL RULES OF RACING § 11-030(A) (Ass'n of Racing
Comm'rs Int'l 2002), available at http://www.arci.com/modelrules.html.
98 CODE OF STANDARDS (2011), supra note 9, § 1(B).
9 see
96 Id.

§ 1(D)

" See id
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unsoundness, infirmity, non-permitted medication, or any other medical
condition.' 00
(b) The Creation of a Safer Racing Environment

The Alliance has taken the lead in promoting the creation of a safer
racing environment for everyone involved in the sport including the horses,
jockeys, handlers, gate stewards, trainers, owners, and fans.' 0 ' The Alliance,
and its members, has made a public commitment to encourage the horse
racing industry to collectively invest in the modernization of its existing
infrastructure and in the design of new practices to create a safer racing
environment for all parties involved. To that end, as a condition for
accreditation, Alliance certified tracks are required to advocate for and
adhere to various safety measures related to horse shoes and hoof care;
riding crops; safety equipment, including helmets and safety vests;
substance abuse and addiction policies; safety research; safety training and
continuing education; uniform national trainers testing; catastrophic injury
planning and procedures; infectious disease management; fire safety
planning and procedures; paddock safety; safety committees; and veterinary
care. 102
(c) Medication and Testing

The Alliance advocates for the adoption of a national uniform
policy governing the use of drugs and therapeutic medications for horse
racing.'o3 It does so to better facilitate the training and racing of horses in
multiple states.104 Without proper pre- and post-race drug and medication
testing and related security procedures, the safety of the sport's participants,
the wagering public, and the integrity of the sport itself cannot be
guaranteed. Therefore, the Code includes standards covering, among other
things, uniform medication rules and penalties; alkalinizing substances;
exogenous anabolic steroids; shock wave therapy; out of competition
testing; frozen sample testing; laboratory quality assurance; security
assessments and training; and the establishment of medication and testing
education committees. 0 5
Alliance accreditation is also conditioned on certified tracks
petitioning local regulatory authorities for the adoption and implementation
00

Id.
101Id.
102
03

Id

Id

§ 1(E).
§ 2.

§ 2(A)-(N).

§ 3.
CODE OF STANDARDS (2011), supra note 9,
"'5Id. § 3(A)-(I).
1

§ 3.
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of uniform rules regulating the use of drugs and therapeutic medications, as
well as uniform minimum penalties consistent with ARCI Model Rules
based on Racing and Medication Testing Consortium (the "RMTC")
recommendations.1 06 To the extent that drugs and therapeutic medications
are not regulated by the states, accredited members must advocate for the
adoption of such rules and penalties to do So.107 Again, where rules are not
consistent with national standards, advocacy is required for accredited
tracks to maintain accreditation.
Under the Code, at the time of application for Alliance
accreditation, tracks must submit a proposed plan for prohibiting and
testing for the use of alkalinizing substances in a manner consistent with
RMTC recommendations. 0 8 Likewise, the prohibition on the use of
exogenous anabolic steroids in training and in competition must also be
consistent with RMTC recommendations.' 09 In racing jurisdictions where
alkalinizing substances and exogenous steroids are not already regulated,
Alliance accredited tracks are required to advocate for the adoption of such
rules by their respective local regulators."l0
The Alliance also supports uniform drug testing standards."'
Alliance accredited tracks must advocate for the official testing laboratories
in their respective jurisdictions to participate in an externally approved
Quality Assurance Program.11 2 Currently, there are eighteen different
laboratories in the United States that serve a combined thirty-eight different
racing jurisdictions." 3 Despite serving the same purpose, there is significant
variation in the quality and type of tests performed at these facilities,"l 4
which is a result of the decentralized regulatory model that exists today.
Through the efforts of the RMTC and Alliance accredited tracks, the racing
industry is attempting to establish consistent reference, research, and testing
laboratories.
(d) Safety and Health ofJockeys
In addition to protecting the safety and health of equine athletes, the
Code also includes multiple standards that focus on the safety and health of
106Id.

§ 3(A).

107Id.
108Id. § 3(B).

1o9Id.
110CODE OF STANDARDS (2011), supranote 9,

§ 3(B)-(C).

]" Id. § 3.
112Id § 3(G).
113 Alan Foreman, Chairman & CEO, Thoroughbred Horsemen's Ass'n Inc., Address at the
Jockey Club Annual Round Table Conference: Drug Testing Initiative (Aug. 22, 2010) (transcript

available at http://www.jockeyclub.com/roundtable08.asp?section=10).
114Id.
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jockeys." 5 As described in the Code, Alliance accredited tracks must
adhere to specific standards relating to jockey weight, jockey scale of
weights, jockey health information system, and other pertinent jockey
qualifications.1 16 Accredited tracks must adhere to provisions governing
ambulance support, medical care, insurance, and disability support in an
accredited track's racing jurisdiction. 17
(e) Aftercarefor RetiredHorses

Guidelines are also provided in the Code for the aftercare and
transition of retired racehorses.118 To join the Alliance, Members must
acknowledge their responsibility to provide care and retraining for
racehorses after they can no longer compete on the racetrack.l 9 The Code
goes further and calls for Alliance accredited tracks to affiliate with
recognized placement and adoption programs that satisfy criteria
established by the American Association of Equine Practitioners. 12 0
In support of this goal, accredited tracks must assist in the transfer
of their horses to recognized placement and adoption programs by taking
steps such as, but not limited to providing owners and trainers with contact
information for recognized placement and adoption programs, promoting
placement and adoption programs, cooperating with state funded programs,
and providing stalls and/or staff to help facilitate the transfer of horses to
affiliated recognized placement and adoption facilities. 12 1
Recently, a broad-based group of Thoroughbred industry
stakeholders announced the establishment of the Thoroughbred Aftercare
Alliance (TAA), which is intended as both the accrediting body for
aftercare facilities that care for Thoroughbreds following the conclusion of
their racing careers and a fundraising body to raise financial support for
approved facilities.122 The Alliance has worked closely with the organizers
of the TAA and will be a major supporter of the effort going forward.123
Consistent with the evolutionary nature of the Code, there is no doubt that
the next version of the Code will include enhancements to this section
"' CODE OF STANDARDS (2011), supra note 9,

§ 4.

"6 Id §4(A)-(D).
" Id. §4(E)-(H).
8
" Id. § 5.
19Id.
120 id.
121CODE OF STANDARDS (2011), supra
note 9, 5.
22 Blood-Horse Staff, ThoroughbredAftercare Alliance

§

Formed, BLOODHORSE.COM (Feb.

13, 2012),
http://www.bloodhorse.com/horse-racing/articles/67383/thoroughbred-aftercare-allianceformed.
123

id.
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related to support for the TAA. In particular, the Alliance will likely
support the TAA in its efforts to educate owners about the responsibilities
of horse ownership and about the various options for retiring their horses
once their racing careers are over.
(f) Wagering Security

The Alliance also requires a high degree of wagering security to
ensure public confidence in the pari-mutuel wagering system.124 To uphold
the integrity of the betting process, Alliance accredited tracks must
incorporate stop wagering devices and a hierarchical system responsible for
stop wagering.1 25 Every simulcast sales contract of an accredited track must
stipulate that the accredited track has the right to request and receive
transactional data, including, but not limited to, tickets sold, tickets
canceled, and time verifications.126 A variety of other wagering incident
prevention protocols must also be adopted to mitigate wagering issues and
to guarantee that the system operates efficiently and effectively.12 7
Furthermore, the Code sets forth wagering incident investigation
protocols where accredited tracks must promptly conduct a thorough
investigation of any and all suspected wagering incidents.12 8 Accredited
tracks must notify the appropriate regulatory authority after an incident has
occurred, and must provide transactional data and video of the race to other
investigatory entities when reasonably requested.129 Additionally,
accredited tracks must disclose any incidents to the public, unless an
ongoing investigation would be compromised.'" Reporting mechanisms
have to be implemented for wagering incidents that are easily accessible to
the wagering public and employees who might have knowledge of the
occurrence of a wagering incident. To mitigate wagering incidents,
accredited tracks must adopt minimum requirements for wagering entities
to be permitted access to their simulcast wagering pools. Each accredited
track must also guarantee that wagering entities maintain proper licensing
and the requisite qualifications. 3 1

124

CODE OF STANDARDS (2011), supra note 9,

25

§ 6.

' 1d § 6(A)(1).
126Id. § 6(A)(2).
127 See id §
6(A).
128Id. § 6(B)(1).
129 Id. § 6(B)(2).
130CODE OF STANDARDS (2011), supra note 9,
31

Id

§ 6(C).

§ 6(B)(3).
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4. The Alliance Provides Flexibility

The Alliance is a flexible and evolving solution that is annually
updated to reflect changing circumstances. Not only does it provide a
degree of national uniformity without federal regulation, it also provides a
cooperative industry solution to the varying and often inconsistent state
regulations. Additionally, the Alliance aims for transparency by issuing
annual public reports to monitor the progress of achieving Alliance
objectives.' 3 2 Further, the Alliance provides regular, public communications
with horse racing fans, regulators, legislators, and industry stakeholders to
transparency. 133
maintain
With standards covering medication and testing, injury reporting
and prevention, safety research, and a safer racing environment, the
Alliance represents the highest degree of uniformity for equitable standards
made by horsemen, for horsemen. Although the horse racing industry is
composed of many different racing stakeholders, the Code promulgated by
the Alliance unites all racing members under one general set of principles
that are flexible and ever evolving. In fact, Alliance members may petition
for amendments to the Code as new research becomes available or public

sentiments change.13 4
5. The Alliance Provides an Affordable Solution

The Alliance pursues cost effective means for implementing and
enforcing the Code in each racing jurisdiction. Based on a collective
agreement for spreading the costs evenly throughout the industry, Alliance
accredited tracks assume the responsibility of contributing to the overall
costs of supporting and maintaining the Code.135 While the Code does not
specifically address allocations of cost, it recognizes that costs will differ
depending on location and need. 3 6 Accordingly, costs will be addressed at
the local level through the normal contractual or regulatory process to
ensure that each racing jurisdiction pays the appropriate costs relative to
their desires. This is a realistic solution that avoids the unreasonable
expenses that come from overly bureaucratic federal regulation.

32See id § III(B) (stating that Alliance will review audit and review its members).
NTRA Safety and Integrity Alliance Pledge, NAT'L THOROUGHBRED RACING Ass'N,

available at http://www.ntra.com/images/NTRASafetyAndintegrityInitiativePledge.pdf (last visited
Apr. 1, 2012).
134 CODE OF STANDARDS (2011), supra note 9, at 2 (Nat'l Thoroughbred Racing Ass'n Safety
& Integrity Alliance 2011).
"' Id. at 3.
36Id.
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6. The StandardsAdvocated by the Alliance are Enforceable
The Alliance does not rely solely on the voluntary commitment of
its Members to achieve compliance with the Code. Like other SROs, the
Alliance assures compliance through a rigorous accreditation process.13 7 In
order to achieve accreditation, tracks must submit an extensive application,
along with supporting documentation. 38 An assessment team then reviews
the application and conducts an extensive onsite inspection to ascertain that
the information provided is accurate.139 The validation process consists of
interviews of key racetrack personnel, firsthand observation of racetrack
operational procedures, and review of any additional relevant information
not previously provided. Assessment teams receive unfettered access to the
racetrack premises, personnel, equipment, and documentation in the course
of their review.14 0 A separate aftercare committee of the Alliance conducts
an assessment of each track's aftercare program to confirm compliance with
the Code's aftercare criteria.141 The assessment team then grades the track
application according to each criterion.142
To receive full accreditation, the track must receive a grade of
"satisfactory" or better on all of the critical application criteria. 143 Tracks
receiving one or more "less than satisfactory" grades are provided the
opportunity to take immediate corrective action.14 4 Failure to correct the
problem may result in a conditional accreditation or the denial of an
accreditation application, depending on the severity of the problem and the
steps necessary to correct the problem promptly. 14 Accreditation lasts for a
maximum of two years, subject to the maintenance of an approved
compliance program to assure continued compliance throughout the entire
accreditation period.14 6 Failure to maintain compliance can result in the
revocation or suspension of accreditation prior to the end of the
accreditation period. 147
Alliance accreditation has quickly become an important seal of
approval for tracks attempting to demonstrate to the public their
commitment to safety and integrity. The quality of tracks that have quickly
1' See id
138NTRA

§ III(B) (providing the conditions for accreditation).
Safety and Integrity Alliance Pledge, supra note 133; see also THOMPSON, supra

note 85.
1' THOMPSON,
40

1

supra note 85, at 3.

d.

141 Id.

42 Id.

145See THOMPSON, supra note 85,
at 4.
46
1 Id. at 10.
47

See CODE OF STANDARDS (2011), supra note 9, at 3.
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embraced the Alliance and its accreditation process speaks volumes about
the value of the certification. The inability to gain accreditation and/or the
loss of accreditation once achieved is sufficient punishment to encourage
compliance. Nonetheless, the added benefit of state regulatory involvement
gives added meaning and impact to non-compliance. Tracks that fail to drug
test or perform pre-race inspections not only risk the loss of their accredited
status, but in many cases they also risk the loss of their license to conduct
pari-mutuel horse racing.
7. The Alliance Promotes National Uniformity

In every instance where industry participants have agreed upon
safety and integrity matters, the goal is national uniformity. The very
purpose of the accreditation process is to determine compliance with the
national standards, as set forth in the Code. Consequently, non-compliance,
in and of itself, is not always the basis for denial of accreditation. In many
circumstances, the state regulations simply do not exist to support
accreditation, but because the larger goal is the adoption of regulatory
uniformity, the Code provides an advocacy exception. 148 In relevant part,
the Code states:
Notwithstanding anything in this Code to the contrary, the
inability of a Member to comply with any provision of this
Code due to contrary legislative or regulatory enactment
shall not be the basis for denial or revocation of
accreditation so long as the Member petitions the legislative
or regulatory authority and diligently seeks to amend the
contrary provisions to bring it into conformity with the
Code. 149
Additionally, the Alliance-based model incorporates house rules, ACRI
model rule development procedures, and uniform model rule adoption at
the state level to effectuate the implementation of the Code.' 50 In this way,
the accreditation of the Alliance's racing Members supports and strengthens
the state regulatory structure.
For example, Churchill Downs in Louisville, Kentucky adopted the
use of a cushioned riding crop in the form of a private racetrack mandate or
house rule. The house rule process was necessary because the Kentucky
Horse Racing Commission had not yet made use of a cushioned crop as a
148id.
4

19id.
150Id.
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statutory requirement as required by Section 2B of the Code. To be
accredited, Churchill had to petition the Kentucky Horse Racing
Commission to adopt a regulatory requirement regarding cushioned crops.
As a direct result of the petition, a cushioned crop rule was adopted in
Kentucky soon thereafter.
Churchill Downs was also required to petition the Kentucky Horse
Racing Commission to adopt a rule allowing for out-of-competition testing
to be conducted on horses racing in Kentucky to satisfy Section 3E of the
Code. As a result of advocacy by Churchill (and other accredited Kentucky
tracks,) the Kentucky Horse Racing Commission adopted an out-ofcompetition testing rule in the summer of 2010.
Pimlico Racetrack in Baltimore, Maryland, sought Alliance
accreditation in the spring of 2009, but because it failed to meet all of the
standards for accreditation outlined in the Code, Pimlico was provisionally
accredited. To by fully accredited, Pimlico and Maryland Racing
Commission had to make changes to their medication rules to bring them in
line with the ARCI Model Rules. As a result, the Maryland Racing
Commission has adopted or is in the process of adopting: (1) pre-race
sampling protocols for alkalinizing substances as part of it drug testing
program; (2) out-of-competition testing; and (3) frozen sample testing. 5 1
Consequently, Pimlico has been awarded full accreditation status.15 2
In fact, since the Alliance's first accreditation in April 2009, every
accredited track has been required to make changes, and in almost every
instance, those changes have come, at least in part, as the result of
cooperation and support from state regulators. These positive changes are
occurring rapidly, but not without significant deliberations among affected
stakeholders. All of these changes point out an important fact:
Accreditation is not a purely voluntary act. Accreditation requires
constructive engagement by tracks and horsemen with state regulators in
which all parties agree to adopt permanent standards and practices. The end
result is institutionalized change on a nationwide basis.
8. The Alliance is Available Now

As stated above, twenty-four tracks in the United States and
Canada have been accredited as being in compliance with the Alliance
Code. 5 3 These include some of the largest and most visited tracks in the
United States. 5 4 Importantly, this also means that regulatory authorities in
'51See THOMPSON, supra note 85, at 5-6.
152See

id. at 5.

"' Id. at 4-5.
'54id
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some twelve states are knowledgeable, cooperative, and supportive of the
Code and its standards. As more tracks in additional states go through the
accreditation process, the goal of uniformity will be advanced. In the end,
the Alliance is an option that is available now, regardless of the regulatory
environment or commitment to uniformity and it has proven to have an
efficient and effective impetus for nationwide change.
9. The Alliance is Responsive to Public Concerns

Not only is the Alliance immediately available, it is responsive to
public concerns and addresses more than regulatory oversight. It represents
an industry-wide commitment not only driven by government mandate, but
also by sincere motive for the safety and integrity of the sport. Many of the
Code provisions, like the funding of safety research and the support for
aftercare organizations, transcend regulatory mandates. The goal is not
simply to improve the way our industry is regulated and governed but also
to strengthen the public's confidence in our industry's commitment to
safety and integrity as a whole.
VII. CONCLUSIONS

To the question frequently asked of horse racing, whether the sport
is capable of making meaningful and positive reforms without external
intervention, the answer is a resounding "Yes." Horse racing does indeed
have the will and structure to accomplish the reforms necessary to respond
to the public's demands for change. The NTRA's Safety and Integrity
Alliance is well positioned to facilitate the adoption of changes needed for
horse racing to grow and flourish in the future. By encouraging national
uniformity based on industry developed and agreed to minimum standards
through a rigorous accreditation, compliance, and enforcement program, the
industry is already changing for the better in many respects. But
accreditation is more than a voluntary act. Accreditation demands
constructive engagement by tracks and horsemen with state regulators to
make sure that Alliance standards and practices are incorporated into each
state's regulatory framework. With twenty-four racetracks in the United
States and Canada now accredited, the only question that remains is why
more tracks are not being accredited. Once industry leaders, including
owners, trainers, and horseplayers, begin supporting accredited tracks with
their horses and their wagered dollars, the move to accreditation will be
complete. The Alliance, once firmly established, will be the horse racing
industry's best opportunity for bringing about meaningful and significant
reforms to the sport of horse racing today.

